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NOTES
CHILD ABUSE: CIVIL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS FOR
389,
FAILURE TO REPOT-Landerosv. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d
131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
In the past fifteen years the plight of the physically abused
child has received extensive attention in medical, legal, and sociological journals.' The result has been the emergence of a new medical diagnosis known as the battered child syndrome.' The syndrome
child receives from his
-takes its name from the "battering" the
3
major diagnostic feaThe
caretaker.
abusive parent(s) or ostensible
the clinical findings
between
tures are: (1) a marked discrepancy
and the historical data supplied by the caretaker, and (2) several
fractures in various stages of healing as revealed by a long-line Xray.' For a child so afflicted the risk of death or serious injury is
great.5 In addition, many researchers believe the incidence of the
syndrome to be of epidemic proportions, although there is little
agreement as to the actual number of such cases.' Once diagnosed,
proper medical treatment requires reporting to proper police and
juvenile authorities for a follow-up investigation and provision for
protective custody in appropriate cases.'
State legislatures quickly responded to the problem of identifying the battered child. In 1963 California passed the first battered
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7. Kempe, The Battered Child Syndrome, supra note 2, at 20.
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child reporting statute,' requiring physicians and other strategically
located professionals to report suspected cases of physical abuse. By
1967 every state, as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands, had enacted similar statutes designed to encourage the reporting of physical child abuse.' All of these statutes recognize that
physicians, due to their expertise and strategic position, play a vital
role in the identification of battered children.
Landeros v. Flood' involved the attempt of a battered child to
impose civil liability upon a physician and hospital for negligently
failing to diagnose and report the battered child syndrome. It is a
case of first impression in the United States at the state appellate
and state supreme court levels," and is, therefore, of important
precedential and persuasive value.
I. THE FACTS
On April 26, 1971, Mrs. Landeros took her eleven month old
daughter, Gita, to San Jose Hospital in Santa Clara County, California. 2 In addition to bruises, abrasions, and a fractured leg, the
infant was also suffering from a fractured skull, the result of a beating by her mother and her mother's common law husband on an
earlier occasion. Despite the mother's inability to adequately explain how her child's leg had been fractured, Dr. A. J. Flood, the
attending physician, failed to diagnose the injuries as the battered
child syndrome. After her leg was treated, Gita was returned to her
mother.
Several weeks later the child was again taken to a nearby hospital. She received treatment for various injuries including a blackeye,
puncture wounds across her back and lower leg, bite marks on her
face, and second and third degree burns on her hand. This time the
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970).
9. For a listing of the statutes see Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of
Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967).
10. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
11. Robinson v. Wycol, Action No. 37607 (1972), in San Luis Obispo County was a
similar malpractice action based on a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970),
Non-Accidental Injury to Children. The battered child in that case was a five month old boy
who ultimately suffered permanent brain damage which left him institutionalized with an
I.Q. of 24 for the rest of his life. The case was settled out of court for $600,000 after the judge
informed the defendant on the third day of trial that he intended to direct the verdict for
the plaintiff and only allow the jury to determine the amount of damages. The case was
reported in TIME, Nov. 20, 1972, at 74.
12. The facts are based on the amended complaint. It is well settled that facts alleged
in the complaint must be accepted as true for pleading purposes. Cusdudio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 310, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1967). Since the case was decided on the pleadings,
the facts as alleged will be accepted as true for the purposes of discussion and analysis.
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attending physician recognized the battered child syndrome and
reported it to police and juvenile authorities. As a result, the child
'
was placed in protective custody." Gita Landeros's guardian ad
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4
County.'
Clara
Santa
of
Court
Hospital in the Superior
II.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY

The plaintiff attempted to establish liability based upon several theories of recovery.'" First, the complaint alleged that Dr.
Flood was liable for professional common law negligence in failing
to diagnose and treat the battered child syndrome. Had Dr. Flood
not been negligent, the complaint alleged, he would have been put
on notice by the child's observable injuries and the mother's inability to account for them. Proper medical procedure in such cases
requires a complete skeletal X-ray which would have revealed the
skull fracture and virtually confirmed the diagnosis. Proper treatment also requires reporting to proper police officials. Thus, the
complaint alleged that having breached his duty to the child, the
defendant was the proximate cause of her subsequent injuries.
The second theory advanced by the plaintiff to establish the
liability of defendants was based on alleged violations of California's
specific and general reporting statutes.', General reporting statutes,
Penal Code sections 11160 and 11161, require hospitals and physicians to notify appropriate police officials of any injury which they
have "probable cause" to suspect has been inflicted in violation of
any penal law of the state." Since Gita's caretakers severely injured
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child abuse in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970).
14. 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. App. 1975).
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CODE PENAL CODE §
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§§ 11160,
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The su11161 (West 1970). A fourth cause of action for punitive damages was abandoned.
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16. Landeros v. Flood, 123 Cal Rptr. 713, 716.
by Violence
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 1970), Reporting Injuries Inflicted
states in relevant part:
in the state
Every person, firm, or corporation conducting any hospital or pharmacy
. . . in
. . to which any person suffering from any wound or other injury inflicted
same
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or
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immediately, both by telephone and in writing, to the chief of police. . . .The
character
shall state the name of the injured person, if known, his whereabouts and the
and extent of his injuries. (emphasis added).
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the child in violation of Penal Code section 273(a), which prohibits
wilful child abuse, plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated
sections 11160 and 11161 and were, therefore, the proximate cause
of her subsequent injuries. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the
physician violated California's specific battered child reporting act,
Penal Code section 11161.5, which was enacted in 1963.18 This statute requires physicians, but not hospitals, to report injuries to minors which appear from observation to have been caused by other
than accidental means.' 9 Since the child's wounds were intentionally inflicted, the complaint alleged that the doctor's negligent failure to report was the proximate cause of her later injuries.
Following the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, and an
adverse ruling by the appellate court, the plaintiff petitioned the
California Supreme Court for a hearing. The hearing was granted
and in a unanimous decision the supreme court reversed the lower
courts.2 0 This casenote will be devoted to an analysis of the court of
appeals and supreme court opinions. Attention will be given to the
professional negligence theory of recovery and the construction
given the California reporting statutes. Important public policy
ramifications will also be considered.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161 (West 1970), Report by Physician or Surgeon states:

Every physician or surgeon who has under his charge or care any person suffering from
any wound or injury inflicted in the manner specified in section 11160 shall make
a
report of the kind specified in this article to the appropriate officers named in section
11160.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970), Non-Accidental Injuries to Children, states
in relevant part:
In any case in which a minor is brought to a physician. . . for diagnosis, examination,
or treatment . . . and it appears to the physician . . . from observation of the minor
that the minor has physical injury or injuries which appear to have been inflicted upon
him by other than accidental means by any person, he shall report such fact
by
telephone and in writing to the local police authority having jurisdiction and the
juvenile probation department. The report shall state, if known, the name of
the
minor, his whereabouts, and the character and extent of the injuries. (emphasis
added).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970).
20. The defendants filed general demurrers contending that the complaint did not state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Following a hearing the trial court sustained
the demurrers with leave to the plaintiff to amend. The complaint was amended,
but the
defendants' demurrers were once again sustained. The plaintiff then appealed requesting
the
court of appeals to reverse and to hold that physicians and hospitals that neglect to diagnose
and report cases of child battering do so at the risk of incurring civil liability for later
injury
to the child. Not satisfied with the appellate decision, the plaintiff petitioned for
and was
granted a hearing before the California Supreme Court which unanimously reversed the
lower
courts. 17 Cal. 3d at 400-01, 551 P.2d at 390-91, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
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III. THE COMMON LAW PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE THEORY
The elements of a cause of action for professional malpractice
are well settled.2' They are:
(1) the duty of a professional to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess;
(2) breach of that duty;
(3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and,
2
(4) damage stemming from the negligent act. "
The court of appeals simply short-circuited this theory of recovery
by ruling as a matter of law that the battered child syndrome,
although widely discussed in medical journals,3 had not yet achieved
the status of an accepted medical diagnosis. This ruling affirmed
the trial court's decision to prevent the plaintiff from proving by
medical expert testimony that the battered child syndrome was an
accepted medical diagnosis.24 Thus, since the syndrome was not, as
a matter of law, part of the requisite skill and knowledge commonly
of the profession, defendant Flood was under
possessed by members
2
no duty to diagnose.

1

The appellate court also held as a matter of law that the ele2
ment of proximate cause was lacking. " This ruling was based on the
court's finding that Dr. Flood did not have a duty to diagnose and
treat the syndrome and was not alleged to have known that the child
was so afflicted. The court held that if a common law duty to report
exists, it arises only if the physician knows the child is suffering7
from the disease or if he is negligent in discovering the condition.
Since the defendant did not have a duty to discover the battered
child syndrome and did not in fact know that plaintiff was a battered child, no common law duty to report arose. In the absence of
duty, the physician's failure to discover and report was not negligent
and could not, therefore, have been the proximate cause of the
subsequent injuries.
The California Supreme Court correctly rejected the reasoning
of the appellate court. The court held that whether the battered
child syndrome has achieved the status of an acceptable medical
21. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Brown v. Colm, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 642-43, 522 P.2d 668, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128, (1974);
764 (1970).
Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780, 788, 478 P.2d 480, 484, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760,
23. Landeros v. Flood, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
24. Id. at 718.
25. Id. at 719.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 720.
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diagnosis could not be decided as a matter of law by a reviewing
court.2" This determination, the court held, was not within the competence of the appellate and supreme courts. The court did, however, take judicial notice of the following facts, which bear upon the
acceptability of the syndrome as a medical diagnosis:
(1) the battered child syndrome was first identified by the
medical profession in the early 1950's; and since Dr. Kempe, et. al,
published the landmark article entitled The Battered Child
Syndrome in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
1962, many additional studies have been conducted which support
his findings;"9
(2) a California appellate court in People v. Jackson,30 a criminal child abuse case, found the battered child syndrome to be "an
accepted medical diagnosis;"' 3
(3) the syndrome has been variously recognized by trial courts
as a legally qualified medical diagnosis.3 1 Justice Mosk, writing for
the court, nevertheless ruled that at the present time the status of
the diagnosis is still a question of fact which must be determined
by expert medical testimony at trial.3 The plaintiff, therfore, should
have been afforded the opportunity to prove not only that the syndrome is an accepted medical diagnosis, but also that the disease
is part of the requisite skill and knowledge possessed by practitioners in the profession.
The supreme court also rejected the appellate court's ruling
that proximate cause was absent as a matter of law. 34 The lower
court never directly addressed the issue, holding only that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to diagnose and report. Whether the
physician's failure to diagnose and treat was the proximate cause
of the child's subsequent injuries, according to the supreme court,
ultimately becomes a question of whether the intervening acts were
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.3 The intervening criminal
acts of third parties will not supersede another's negligence if such
acts were reasonably foreseeable .3 Professional literature on the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

17 Cal. 3d 399, 410, 551 P.2d 389, 394, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1976).
Id. at 409, 551 P.2d at 393, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920 (Cal. App. 1971).
17 Cal. 3d 399, 409, 551 P.2d 389, 393, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1976).
Id. at 409, 551 P.2d at 393, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
Id. at 410, 551 P.2d at 394, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
Id. at 412, 551 P.2d at 395, 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75, 76.
Id. at 411, 551 P.2d at 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) states that foreseeability may arise directly
from the risk
created by the original act of negligence:
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subject of battered children repeatedly points out that repetition of
7
the abuse is the very nature of the syndrome. The supreme court,
therefore, appears correct in holding that the question of foreseeability frames a question for the finder of fact. A plaintiff must be
allowed to prove by expert testimony that the physician should have
reasonably foreseen that the caretakers were likely to continue their
abusive attacks if the child were returned to their custody.
IV.

STATUTORY THEORIES OF RECOVERY

Both courts agreed that plaintiff's attempt to impose civil liability on the defendants for their alleged violation of the California
reporting statutes was permissible. The law is well established that
a penal statute may be employed as a standard of conduct in a civil
negligence suit." In addition, California's Evidence Code section
669 provides that such a violation of a penal statute creates a presumption of negligence provided the plaintiff is a member of the
class to be protected and suffers the type of harm which the statute
seeks to prevent." As to both general and specific reporting statutes,
plaintiff clearly fell into this category.
The problem that confronted the courts concerning the statutory theories of recovery, however, was not whether the statutes
could be employed as a standard of conduct, but:
(1) whether the more recent physical child abuse reporting
statute passed in 1963 had superseded the general reporting statutes
as they pertain to physicians and hospitals; in other words, whether
sections 11160 and 11161, which require hospitals and physicians,
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being
liable for harm caused thereby. (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., Kempe, The Battered Child Syndrome, supra note 2, at 24.
20
38. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 63, 271 P.2d 23, 25 (1954); Routh v. Quinn,
§36
ToRTs
OF
LAW
THE
PROSSER,
W.
also
see
Cal. 2d 488, 491, 492, 127 P.2d 1, 3, 4 (1942);
(4th ed. 1971).
39. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 669 (West 1966) states in relevant part:
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance . . .of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death of injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the
statute, . . . was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute, . . . was adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, . . . did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances,
who desired to comply with the law.
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respectively, to report injuries inflicted in violation of any penal law,
had been superseded by section 11161.5, which requires physicians

and a host of other strategically situated professionals' (but excluding hospitals) to report injuries which appear from observation to
have been caused by other than accidental means; and,
(2) whether liability under the physical child abuse reporting
statute was to be determined by a subjective or an objective
standard: that is, should liability be imposed only if the defendants
in fact were aware the child was suffering from the syndrome, or is
it sufficient for imposition of liability that a reasonably prudent
physician would have recognized the syndrome and reported to proper police authorities?
The court of appeals resolved the supersession issue by holding
that since the specific physical child abuse reporting statute, section
11161.5, was the most recent expression of the legislature's will, it
superseded the general reporting statute, section 11161, in that
both statutes impose a duty on physicians to report physical child
abuse. On the other hand, that court correctly found that since the
child abuse statute does not require hospitals to report, the statute
did not supersede section 11160, the general reporting statute pertaining to hospitals.
This construction in itself would not have seriously damaged
the plaintiff's attempt to hold Dr. Flood civilly liable. She could still
have alleged that the defendant violated the physical child abuse
reporting statute. The court, however, went further and ruled that
a physician could only be held liable under the statute if he in fact
observed that the child was injured by other than accidental
means." This subjective standard would have made plaintiff's task
of proving that defendant Flood violated the statute extremely difficult. Associate Justice Kane, writing for the appellate court,
pointed out that liability must be established on the basis of testimony and evidence obtained from the defendant.42 Since the statute
requires only the reporting of injuries which appearfrom observa40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970) in addition to requiring physicians to report,
also requires:
surgeons, dentists, residents, interns, chiropractors, religious practitioners, . . . registered nurses when in the employ of a public health agency, school district and when
no physician and surgeon, resident, or intern is present, by any superintendent of any
public or private school system or any principal of any public or private school . . .
to report, if the child appears from observation to have been injured by other that accidental
means.
41. Landeros v. Flood, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
42. Id. at 724 n.ll.
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tion to have been inflicted on the minor other than by accidental
means, the appellate court reasoned that to employ an objective
standard would "impose an intolerable burden upon those persons
required to report."43
The supreme court disagreed with this construction of the statutes, and in so doing, adopted a view which appears closer to the
intent of the legislature. If the lower court's interpretation were to
prevail, a physician's duty to a battered child brought to him for
medical attention would be less than that which existed prior to the
enactment of the physical child abuse reporting statute. The general
reporting statute, which existed in California well before the enactment of the 1963 child abuse statute, required a physician to report
whenever he had probable cause to believe any person had been
injured in violation of any penal law, including section 273(a) which
prohibits willful child abuse.44 Even though the clear purpose of the
child abuse statute was to encourage the reporting of physically
abused children, the appellate court holding that the 1963 law superseded the general reporting statute and that the child abuse law
required a subjective standard could only serve to give physicians
less incentive to report. This was obviously contrary to legislative
intent.
In contrast to the lower court, the supreme court held that the
1963 physical child abuse reporting statute had not superseded the
older general reporting statute. It reasoned that "there is nothing to
prevent the legislature from imposing a reporting requirement on
45
physicians in two separate statutes, even if the coverage overlaps."
That court, however, did agree with the court of appeals that liability under the physical child abuse reporting statute must be
determined by a subjective standard." The plaintiff must prove
that the particular physician did in fact recognize that the injuries
by other than accidental means.
been inflicted
had• Under
the supreme
court's construction a plaintiff could employ both statutes as a standard of conduct for a physician in a civil
negligence case. The plaintiff could also employ the general reporting statute pertaining to hospitals, section 11160, as a standard of
43.

Id.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970).
CIv. PROC., §
45. 17 Cal. 3d at 414, 551 P.2d at 397, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 77; CAL. CODE
and the
statute
general
older
the
when
only
occurs
1859 (West 1970) states that supersession
provide for the same
11161.5
and
i1161
§
both
Since
"inconsistent."
are
statute
specific
other.
penalty, the supreme court found the two do not require one giving way to the
court found that since
46. 17 Cal. 3d at 414, 551 P.2d at 397, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 77; the
of mind of the physician, the
the statute was ambiguous with respect to the required state
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the offender.
44.
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conduct in a similar civil action against a hospital. Plaintiff's burden of proof under the specific child abuse statute and the general
reporting statutes, however, would differ considerably.
In order to establish liability based on the general reporting
statutes a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that an ordinary physician or hospital under the same or
similar circumstances would have had probable cause to suspect the
injuries were inflicted in violation of section 273(a) which prohibits
wilful child abuse;
(2) that the physician or hospital, therefore, violated the general reporting statute by failing to report, which was the proximate
cause of subsequent injury;
(3) that the injury was of a type sought to be prevented by the
statute; and,
(4) that the plaintiff was a member of the class sought to be
protected by the statute. 7
At this point California Evidence Code section 6694 would shift the
burden to the defendant to prove that he did "what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under
similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law."49
Alternatively, a plaintiff attempting to establish liability for an
alleged violation of the physical child abuse reporting statute,
section 11161.5, will encounter considerable evidentiary problems.
The presumption of liability will be predicated upon proof that the
defendant actually violated the statute. In order to satisfy this
subjective requirement, the plaintiff will have "to persuade the trier
of fact that defendant . . . actually observed the injuries and
formed an opinion they were intentionally inflicted ..
."50
Admittedly, to impose an objective standard on the child abuse
reporting statute would create too great a burden on nonphysicians
who are required to report under the statute. The supreme court,
therefore, seems to have attained the best possible construction of
the statutes involved. While the supreme court agreed with the
lower court that the specific child abuse reporting statute requires
a subjective test, it upheld the objective standard for physicians by
finding that the general reporting statute had not been superseded
by the 1963 statute. Under this construction a physician might not
be liable for failure to report under the physical child abuse statute
47.
48.
49.
50.

CAL. EVIDENCE CODE

§ 669 (West 1970).

Id.
Id.
17 Cal. 3d at 415, 551 P.2d at 397-98, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
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if he was not in fact aware of the nature of the injuries, but may be
liable under the general reporting statute if an ordinary physician
in a like situation would have had probable cause to suspect the
child had been injured in violation of section 273(a).
This interpretation of the statutes maximizes the reporting of
child battering cases. The physical child abuse reporting law was
passed not to lessen the burden on physicians to report, as the
appellate decision would have done, but to increase the number of
those obligated to do so. In light of physicians' expertise and the
strategic position they hold in identifying such children, the construction given these statutes by the California Supreme Court is
to be applauded.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the attention the battered child syndrome has received
in professional journals, physicians and hospitals have been reluc5
tant to report suspected cases of child abuse. ' This is so despite
statutory immunities designed to protect them from liability for
doing so.52 Reasons which have been suggested for this failure to
report include lack of faith in legal and social agencies, misplaced
duty of confidentiality toward the parents instead of the child, and
fear of damage to the physician's private practice.
Regardless of the reason, the cure for battered child syndrome
is protection. Unless the cycle of child abuse is stopped, the future
occurrence of the syndrome can only be expected to increase. There
are no known cases of physicians or hospitals which have been
criminally prosecuted for failing to report. Perhaps civil liability for
failing to report is a necessary sanction to protect the numbers of
51. Letter to the Editor, 46 J.PED. 318 (1970). In this letter, Dr. V. Fontana, a leading
figure in the field, wrote: "Unfortunately, however, these laws have done little to stem the
increase in the maltreatment of children and have not effectively lessened the plight of the
abused and neglected child." Id. at 319. The reason for the ineffectiveness of the laws is that
few doctors bother to report. See Silver, Barten & Dublin, Child Abuse Laws-Are They
Enough?, 199 JAMA 65 (1967), where the authors discuss a 1967 survey of 450 physicians most
likely to come into contact with battered children which disclosed that one of four would not
report a given case of suspected battered child syndrome, one of five rarely or never considered
abuse when treating a child, and over half of them were unaware of the correct reporting
procedure.
shall
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970) states in part, "No physician ...
incur any civil or criminal liabilty as a result of making any report authorized by this section."
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battered children. Landeros v. Flood53 serves that end. 54
Jerome A. Madden

53. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
54. For articles supporting the imposition of civil liability on physicians and hospitals
who fail to report see, e.g., Kohlman, Malpractice Liabilityfor Failing to Report Child Abuse,
49 CALIF. STATE BAR J. 118 (1974) (Mr. Kohlman was one of plaintiff's counsel in this case),
and Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case for Holding Physicians Civilly
Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 756-62 (1975).
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